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Introduction
Signed into law on February 17, 
2009, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) 
subsidizes health coverage for 
uninsured, laid-off workers and provides 
state Medicaid programs with $87 
billion in fiscal relief, delivered over 
nine calendar quarters.1 This paper 
assesses the likelihood that these 
portions of the legislation will achieve 
their goals. 
Health coverage for  
laid-off workers
The legislation
ARRA subsidizes insurance that 
employers offer laid-off workers under 
the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). 
COBRA applies to companies that 
have 20 or more employees and that 
offer health insurance. When such a 
firm terminates a worker it previously 
insured, the company must continue to 
offer coverage for at least 18 months.2 
To enroll, the worker must pay the full 
premium plus a 2 percent administrative 
fee. Under ARRA,
Subsidies pay 65 percent of the •	
cost of enrolling in COBRA plans 
and coverage offered by smaller 
employers subject to similar state-law 
requirements. Forty states have such 
“mini-COBRA” laws.3 
The subsidies are available to •	
workers who lost their jobs between 
September 1, 2008, and December 31, 
2009. For each recipient, the subsidies 
end after nine months. Ineligible for 
subsidies are
 Workers with access to employer-  ›
sponsored insurance (ESI) offered 
by any firm other than their 
former employer;
Summary
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) sought to strengthen the country’s ailing economy 
by enacting a broad range of policies, two of which are 
the subject of this paper. One helps laid-off workers obtain 
health coverage, and the other provides fiscal relief to state 
Medicaid programs. 
The first policy pays 65 percent of premiums for coverage 
offered by former employers under the Comprehensive 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). 
These subsidies are likely to be too small to make coverage 
affordable to many people who have lost their jobs. An 
existing program that pays 65 percent of premiums for 
workers laid off because of trade liberalization—the 
Health Coverage Tax Credit program—enrolls only 12 to 
15 percent of eligible workers. ARRA almost certainly will 
raise participation above those levels, but enrollment is 
likely to remain quite limited. 
Furthermore, ARRA does not cover uninsured, laid-off 
workers who are ineligible for COBRA. Some worked for 
companies that have gone out of business or were too small 
to be governed by COBRA or similar state laws; others did 
not receive health coverage from their former employers. 
Many without access to COBRA would have been helped 
by House-passed Medicaid expansions that covered two 
groups of uninsured, unemployed workers: recipients 
of unemployment insurance, no matter how high their 
income, and low-income laid-off workers and their families, 
who have the least access to coverage and care. These 
Medicaid expansions, however, were not included in the 
final legislation.
By providing state Medicaid programs with $87 billion in 
fiscal relief, ARRA is likely to be effective in preventing 
many large Medicaid cutbacks. Targeting 35 percent of 
assistance to states with particularly high unemployment 
rates, ARRA will provide more “bang for the buck” in 
preventing state cutbacks and stimulating the economy 
than did fiscal relief legislation in 2003–2004, which gave 
all states the same level of help. Nevertheless, since most 
of the fiscal relief is distributed without regard to each 
state’s economic situation, the states with the most serious 
fiscal problems may not obtain sufficient assistance to avoid 
reducing health care services. 
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 Workers who qualify for    ›
Medicare; and
 Workers with incomes above   ›
$145,000 a year for an individual 
or $290,000 a year for a couple.4 
After billing subsidy-eligible workers •	
for their 35 percent share, health 
plans collect the 65 percent subsidies 
by reducing income and payroll tax 
withholding they would otherwise 
owe the federal government for all 
their employees.5
Both the House and Senate bills 
proposed 12 rather than 9 months of 
subsidies, and neither limited subsidies 
based on income. ARRA accepted the 
House-proposed subsidy level—65 
percent of premiums—rather than 
the Senate’s 50 percent subsidy. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
projected that the enacted COBRA 
subsidy would cost $24.7 billion, 
roughly half-way between the House 
and Senate amounts (table 1).
However, ARRA rejected House-
proposed optional Medicaid coverage 
for laid-off, uninsured workers in 
two major groups:6 (a) recipients 
of unemployment insurance (UI), 
regardless of their income; and (b) 
laid-off workers and their families with 
incomes at or below 200 percent of 
the federal poverty level (FPL).7 The 
House proposal had offered full federal 
funding, without any need for state 
matching dollars. 
Analysis
The legislation’s strengths 
Subsidy administration is significantly 
improved over Health Coverage 
Tax Credits (HCTC), which pay 65 
percent of health insurance premiums 
for workers certified by the U.S. 
Department of Labor as losing their jobs 
because of trade liberalization.8 HCTCs 
can be either advanced directly to the 
insurer when monthly premiums are 
due or claimed at the end of the year 
on income tax forms. Fully refundable, 
the credits can provide laid-off workers 
with COBRA coverage and private 
insurance arranged by the state. HCTC 
has experienced serious administrative 
problems that ARRA avoids:
Cash flow for laid-off workers.•	  In 
many states, HCTC-eligible workers 
must pay premiums in full while they 
wait for advance payment to begin.9 
With ARRA, laid-off workers pay, from 
the start, just their 35 percent share  
of premiums. 
Administrative costs.•	  To advance 
HCTC monthly to insurers when 
premiums are due, IRS spends $1 
in administrative costs to deliver 
$4 in subsidies.10 Such high costs 
result primarily from multiple 
federal transactions for each advance 
payment recipient every month.11 
Administrative costs should be much 
lower with ARRA, which delivers 
subsidies by having health plans 
reduce their federal income tax 
withholding and payroll taxes. 
Among uninsured, COBRA-eligible 
workers, eligibility is well-targeted. 
Subsidies are not limited to workers •	
who receive unemployment 
insurance. This recognizes that many 
fewer unemployed workers receive  
UI now than in the past.12 
The proposal excludes laid-off •	
workers with access to other ESI, 
including spousal coverage and 
insurance offered by new employers. 
This focuses assistance on the laid-off 
workers who, without subsidies, are 
most likely to be uninsured. If no such 
restrictions had applied, much federal 
money would have substituted for 
employers’ health insurance payments 
rather than covered the uninsured.13 
The proposal excludes laid-off •	
workers with annual incomes above 
specified levels, thus focusing finite 
federal resources on households more 
likely to need assistance. 
The legislation’s weaknesses 
The 65 percent subsidy is probably not 
large enough for many laid-off workers 
to afford health coverage.14 With HCTC’s 
65 percent subsidy, only 12 to 15 
percent of eligible households obtain 
health insurance.15 The most important 
reason for this low participation is that 
HCTC-eligible workers are generally 
unable to afford to pay 35 percent of 
premiums.16
Other factors impede HCTC 
participation, including the cash flow 
problem described above.17 By avoiding 
these barriers, the new program will 
raise participation rates above HCTC’s 
12 to 15 percent range. But affordability 
is likely to remain a major problem that 
keeps enrollment at low levels. 
The 35 percent of premiums that ARRA 
requires from the newly unemployed is 
significantly more than what employed 
workers pay for coverage, which 
averages 16 percent of premiums for 
worker-only insurance and 27 percent 
for family coverage.18 It is unrealistic 
to expect that many workers will 
increase the amount they pay for health 
insurance when their income drops 
because of job loss. 
According to estimates from the 
Congressional Joint Committee on 
Taxation, ARRA’s COBRA subsidies will 
cover approximately 7 million people 
(including workers and dependents) 
Table 1.  The Projected Cost of ARRA’s Health Coverage Subsidies for Laid-
Off Workers: House, Senate and Final Versions (billions of dollars) 
House Senate Final legislation
COBRA subsidy $26.7 $22.6 $24.7 
New Medicaid options $13.3 $0.0 $0.0
Total cost $40.0 $22.6 $24.7
Sources: Congressional Budget Office, January 26, 2009, February 9, 2009, and February 13, 2009 (Cost estimates for H.R. 1). 
Note: The table reduces COBRA subsidy costs to reflect offsetting increases in revenue forecast by CBO.
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at some point during 2009.19 This 
projection includes those who would 
have enrolled in COBRA coverage 
without subsidies. 
How many individuals will be eligible 
for subsidies is difficult to quantify. 
During January 2009, a seasonally-
adjusted total of 11.8 million workers 
were involuntarily unemployed, 
with a 19.8-week average duration 
of unemployment.20 If that level and 
duration of unemployment persist 
throughout 2009, 25.8 million workers 
will be unemployed from March 1 
(when COBRA subsidies first become 
available) through the end of the year. 
While taking into account dependents 
would increase the estimated number 
of people who qualify for the subsidy, 
many laid-off workers are ineligible for 
COBRA, and others will be ineligible for 
subsidies under ARRA because of excess 
income, access to group plans offered 
by spousal employers or new employers, 
or eligibility for Medicare. 
Notwithstanding those uncertainties, 
an estimate of 7 million people using 
COBRA subsidies at some point during 
2009, including those who would 
have enrolled in COBRA without the 
subsidy, suggests that a relatively small 
percentage of eligible, uninsured 
workers will retain health coverage  
due to ARRA. 
To avoid low participation, lawmakers 
may need to increase the subsidy 
percentage. One logical benchmark 
is the 80 percent COBRA subsidy 
paid by Massachusetts’s Medical 
Security Program,21 which for 20 
years has provided health coverage 
to unemployed workers—the only 
such state-level program.22 After long 
experience that includes varying 
subsidy levels, that state’s policymakers 
have concluded that 80 percent 
subsidies are needed to make coverage 
affordable to the newly unemployed.23 
Other provisions of ARRA raised the 
HCTC subsidy from 65 percent to 80 
percent of premiums.24 A similar change 
may turn out to be needed for ARRA’s 
COBRA subsidy to reach most if its 
intended beneficiaries.
Raising the subsidy percentage would 
also increase the proportion of healthy 
workers who enroll into COBRA.25 This 
could address some employers’ concern 
that, even with a 65 percent subsidy, 
those who choose COBRA will have 
above-average health care expenses 
that exceed their COBRA premium 
payments, shifting the unpaid health 
care costs to employers and, ultimately, 
to remaining employees.26 
Limiting subsidies to COBRA-eligible 
workers excludes many unemployed, 
uninsured workers—particularly  
those who most need help. ARRA  
does not cover the following groups  
of uninsured, laid-off workers and  
their families: 
Unemployed workers whose former •	
employers are no longer governed by 
COBRA because they have gone out of 
business or stopped offering coverage 
to their current employees; 
Unemployed workers who, before •	
job loss, were employed and covered 
by small firms that were governed by 
neither COBRA nor state mini-COBRA 
laws; and 
Unemployed workers who did not •	
receive coverage from their employers 
before job loss. 
This restriction adversely affects low-
income households. Among workers 
with incomes below 200 percent of the 
federal poverty level in 2008, 38 percent 
would have likely qualified for COBRA 
if they lost their jobs, compared with 76 
percent among workers with incomes 
above that threshold.27 
By making access to COBRA the 
touchstone of subsidy eligibility, ARRA 
targets workers who lost coverage 
when they became unemployed, but 
that ignores the impact of job loss on 
workers who were uninsured before 
they were laid off. Unemployment can 
create or worsen significant medical 
problems,28 increasing the adverse 
health consequences of uninsurance.29 
Also, job loss typically reduces 
household income by substantial 
amounts.30 This may make it more 
difficult for the previously uninsured 
to obtain medical care; out-of-pocket 
payments from the uninsured now 
cover an average of 35 percent of all 
their health care costs.31 
The House-proposed Medicaid options 
would have helped many unemployed, 
uninsured workers who lack access to 
COBRA. Policymakers did not have the 
time to carefully design and implement 
a new health coverage program to 
serve the group left behind by COBRA 
subsidies. The current economic 
emergency and the consequent need 
for speed made it hard to see a practical 
alternative to Medicaid, which already 
covers millions of low-income families 
and regularly determines eligibility for 
means-tested subsidies.32
Based on press accounts, legislators 
may have rejected the House Medicaid 
proposal because some of its eligibility 
groups were not means-tested.33 But 
as noted above, other portions of the 
House bill were limited to laid-off 
uninsured workers who are poor or 
near-poor. Such targeted Medicaid 
options may need to be reconsidered 
if ARRA does not turn out to prevent 
uninsurance among low-income, 
unemployed workers and their families, 
whose difficult economic straits can 
leave them with very little access to 
coverage and care.
State fiscal relief
The legislation
The legislation offers fiscal relief to 
states by increasing federal Medicaid 
payments from October 1, 2008, 
through December 31, 2010. To qualify 
for assistance, a state may not apply 
more restrictive eligibility standards, 
methodologies, or procedures than were 
in effect on July 1, 2008. Payments come 
in two main forms:34
Each state receives a 6.2 percentage •	
point increase in its federal medical 
assistance percentage (FMAP), the 
portion of Medicaid costs paid by  
the federal government. Before  
ARRA, state FMAPs ranged from  
50 to 75.4 percent,35 averaging about 
57 percent.36 
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If during a quarter, a state’s most •	
recent three-month average 
unemployment rate is at least 1.5 
percentage points higher than it 
was during any three-month period 
starting in January 2006, the state 
qualifies for an additional FMAP 
increase. The amount of additional 
funding ranges between 5.5 and 11.5 
percent of a state’s Medicaid costs, 
depending on the state’s increase in 
unemployment (table 2).
The targeted fiscal relief is calculated 
as a percentage of state costs.37 For 
example, if a state’s share of Medicaid 
costs is 35 percent and the state’s 
unemployment rate is 2 percentage 
points above baseline levels, the 
targeted fiscal relief would equal 
5.5 percent of the state’s 35 percent 
Medicaid share—in other words, the 
state would get a 1.925 percentage point 
increase in its FMAP, in addition to the 
universally available FMAP boost of 6.2 
percentage points.38 
The House and Senate versions of the 
proposal provided almost identical 
amounts of relief but differed in 
the proportion of assistance that 
was targeted to states experiencing 
unusually high increases in 
unemployment rates. The final 
legislation compromised at the 
midpoint between the two proposals, 
directing approximately 35 percent of 
all assistance to states in particularly 
difficult economic straits (table 3).
Analysis
The legislation addresses a compelling 
need. Almost every state is legally 
forbidden from running deficits, 
even in a recession. As a result, the 
combination of falling revenue and 
rising caseloads for Medicaid and other 
need-based programs means that, 
without significant federal help, service 
cutbacks or tax increases are inevitable 
during a downturn. Such steps can harm 
households and state economies. 
Shortly before the enactment of 
ARRA, 46 states faced current or 
projected budget deficits that totaled 
approximately $350 billion dollars.39 
The District of Columbia and 32 states 
had enacted or proposed cuts to health 
care services for low-income families, 
seniors, or people with disabilities; 26 
states had proposed or enacted cuts 
to k–12 education; and 32 states had 
proposed or enacted cuts to funding  
for higher education.40
ARRA significantly improves on 
previous state fiscal relief legislation in 
several ways:
“Bang for the buck.”•	  During the 
2003–2004 downturn, Congress 
gave each state an identical 2.95 
percentage point FMAP increase, 
along with block grants based on 
state population. By contrast, ARRA 
provides extra help to states in 
particularly dire economic straits. As a 
result, a fixed amount of federal fiscal 
relief goes further toward preventing 
state cuts, which translates into 
additional stimulus and more help to 
vulnerable households. At the same 
time, comparatively well-off states 
are less likely to receive more federal 
money than they need. 
State accountability.•	  A state 
accepting the 2003–2004 fiscal relief 
was forbidden from cutting back 
eligibility standards. Between this 
requirement and the estimated $20 
billion in federal funds dispensed 
over five quarters, about half of 
the states rescinded prior cutbacks 
or avoided planned reductions.41 
However, 10 states made procedural 
changes that trimmed Medicaid 
caseloads, such as requiring more 
frequent documentation of continued 
eligibility. States also cut benefits, 
reduced provider reimbursement, 
increased cost-sharing, and took other 
measures to cut spending, even while 
eligibility standards remained intact. 
ARRA avoids many of these problems, 
since a state accepting fiscal relief 
must eschew both cutbacks in 
eligibility standards and more 
restrictive eligibility methodologies 
and procedures. On the other hand, 
ARRA permits states to control costs 
Table 2.  Amount of Targeted Fiscal Relief ARRA Provides to States  
Experiencing Increased Unemployment
Increase in state unemployment rates over 
baseline period (percentage points)
Amount of targeted fiscal relief   
(percent of Medicaid costs)
Under 1.5 None
1.5 to 2.49 5.5
2.5 to 3.49 8.5
3.5 or more 11.5
Table 3.  Fiscal Relief Provisions in ARRA: House, Senate, and Final Versions 
House Senate Final legislation
Total amount of fiscal relief from October 1, 2008 through  
December 31, 2010
$87.0 billion $86.6 billion $87.0 billion
Approximate proportion of fiscal relief targeted to states with the largest 
increases in unemployment rates
50 percent 20 percent 35 percent
Sources: Author’s calculation, Government Accountability Office, “State Medicaid Assistance under House and Senate ARRA,” February 2009 (unpublished analysis); Conference Committee Report  
(H. Rept. 111-16), H.R. 1, February 2009. 
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in other ways, which reduces the 
stimulative impact of the legislation 
and may harm beneficiaries. However, 
since ARRA will lessen but not 
eliminate state budget shortfalls, it is 
hard to argue that states should be left 
without any tools to lower projected 
Medicaid spending.
While ARRA will lessen the severity 
of state cutbacks, it will not eliminate 
them. Within days of ARRA’s enactment, 
officials in at least four states rescinded 
previously announced Medicaid 
cutbacks.42 However, ARRA will leave 
untouched approximately 60 percent of 
aggregate state budget shortfalls.43 And 
despite the improvements over previous 
fiscal relief legislation, most of ARRA’s 
Medicaid dollars pay for a uniform 
increase in each state’s FMAP, regardless 
of the state’s need for help. As a result, 
the hardest-hit states are likely find the 
fiscal relief insufficient to prevent major 
reductions. Depending on how the 
recession unfolds in these states, federal 
policymakers may need to consider 
additional, targeted relief. 
Conclusion 
While ARRA will help some laid-off 
workers and their families retain health 
coverage, many are likely to remain 
uninsured. For ARRA to cover the bulk 
of unemployed, uninsured workers, two 
changes may turn out to be necessary: 
the subsidy likely needs to pay a higher 
percentage of COBRA premiums; and 
as proposed in the House bill, state 
Medicaid programs will probably need 
the option to cover laid-off workers and 
their families who have low incomes.
The state fiscal relief provisions of 
the bill are likely to prove effective 
in forestalling many major Medicaid 
cutbacks, thus helping vulnerable 
households and shoring up our ailing 
economy. This effectiveness results from 
both the total amount of assistance that 
ARRA provides and the legislation’s 
targeting of a significant percentage 
of fiscal relief to states experiencing 
unusually severe economic harm. 
However, some states’ fiscal crises are 
so serious that federal policymakers will 
need to monitor the situation carefully 
to see whether additional, targeted 
assistance is required. 
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